While inflation dominated the news about last week’s National People’s Congress, a more interesting story may be the contentious internal debate about rebalancing Chinese growth from investment to consumption. It will prove a difficult task. The evolution of Chinese household consumption is one of the more striking economic stories of recent decades. In the 1980s household consumption comprised 50-52 per cent of China’s GDP – low, but within range of other high-saving Asian countries.

　　在有關(guān)上周中國人大會(huì)議的新聞報(bào)道中，通脹是焦點(diǎn)所在，但是，一場圍繞中國經(jīng)濟(jì)再平衡的內(nèi)部激辯或許會(huì)讓人們更感興趣。從“投資型增長”轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)?ldquo;消費(fèi)型增長”將是一項(xiàng)艱巨的任務(wù)。中國家庭消費(fèi)的演變是近幾十年最令人矚目的經(jīng)濟(jì)事件之一。上世紀(jì)80年代，家庭消費(fèi)在中國GDP中占的比重為50-52%，屬于低水平，但尚在亞洲其他高儲(chǔ)蓄國家所處的范疇之內(nèi)。

　　Over the next decade as China’s economic growth outpaced consumption, household consumption declined slowly as a share of gross domestic product, to reach a worrying 46 per cent in 2000. Such a low share left rising investment and trade surpluses as the main engines of Chinese growth. Both rose rapidly during the next decade, generating growth of over 10 per cent annually.

　　在之后的十年內(nèi)，由于中國經(jīng)濟(jì)增速快于消費(fèi)增速，家庭消費(fèi)在GDP中的占比緩慢下降，到2000年降至令人擔(dān)憂的46%。不斷擴(kuò)大的投資和貿(mào)易順差由此成為拉動(dòng)中國經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的主要引擎。在接下來的十年內(nèi)，這兩個(gè)環(huán)節(jié)迅速擴(kuò)張，推動(dòng)中國經(jīng)濟(jì)年均增長10%以上。

　　In the next decade, however, thanks to the urgent need to repair China’s bankrupt banks, the divergence accelerated, and by 2005 consumption dropped to an unprecedented 40 per cent of GDP. Under Premier Wen Jiabao’s leadership Beijing resolved to rebalance the economy and increase the share of household consumption. But the low consumption share wasn’t an accident. It is fundamental to the growth model and cannot be reversed without abandoning the model. Not surprisingly, Beijing was unwilling to do so, and household consumption declined further over the rest of the decade to an astonishing 35 per cent of GDP.

　　然而，在接下來的十年內(nèi)，由于處于破產(chǎn)境地的中國各家銀行亟需救助，消費(fèi)與投資和出口以更快的速度背道而馳。到2005年，消費(fèi)的占比降至40%這一前所未有的最低水平。在溫家寶總理領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下，中國政府決心推動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)均衡增長，提高家庭消費(fèi)在經(jīng)濟(jì)中的比重。但是，低消費(fèi)并非偶然現(xiàn)象，而是現(xiàn)有增長模式的根本特征。不放棄現(xiàn)有模式，就無法改變低消費(fèi)。果不其然，中國政府不愿意這么做。于是，接下來的5年里，家庭消費(fèi)比重進(jìn)一步下滑到35%，令人愕然。

　　China’s breakneck economic growth was fuelled by vast transfers of household wealth, which subsidised the manufacturing and investment boom and paid for bad loans. The most important of these transfers is the very low interest rate set by the central bank, which takes at least 5-7 per cent of GDP every year from households to give to banks and borrowers. Lower household wealth, of course, means lower household consumption.

　　中國經(jīng)濟(jì)的極速增長受到了大規(guī)模家庭財(cái)富轉(zhuǎn)移的推動(dòng)。家庭財(cái)富的轉(zhuǎn)移為制造業(yè)和投資的繁榮提供了補(bǔ)貼，并為不良貸款埋單。其中最重要的因素是央行制定的極低利率。在低利率的作用下，每年從家庭轉(zhuǎn)移給銀行和貸款者的財(cái)富起碼占GDP的5-7%。家庭財(cái)富減少，自然導(dǎo)致家庭消費(fèi)下降。

　　China’s investment-driven growth model is not unique. Many countries have used a version of this successful strategy, but all run into the same constraint. Rapidly expanding, politically directed investment tends to be misallocated. The losses are disguised, but not eliminated, by the huge hidden interest-rate subsidies.

　　投資驅(qū)動(dòng)型的增長模式并非中國所獨(dú)有。許多國家都有過成功的先例，但也都遇到了同樣的困境。迅速擴(kuò)張、受政府指導(dǎo)的投資往往存在配置不當(dāng)?shù)膯栴}。所造成的損失會(huì)被巨額隱性利率補(bǔ)貼掩蓋起來，但不會(huì)因此消失。

　　China is no exception. It is misallocating capital on an unsustainable scale. So now Beijing must allow households to increase their share of the vast wealth generated in recent decades so that consumption, and not more investment, can be the next great driver of growth. But here’s the catch. Rebalancing requires that China reduce investment growth. The more bad investment China piles up, the more it must transfer wealth from households to keep those investments viable. But lower investment will cause a dramatic drop in economic growth. Accelerating investment is the only way policymakers can maintain high growth rates.

　　中國也不例外。中國資本錯(cuò)配的規(guī)模之大已到了難以維系的地步。因此，現(xiàn)在中國政府必須允許家庭從近幾十年產(chǎn)生的巨額財(cái)富中獲得更大份額，使消費(fèi)取代投資，成為未來經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的主要推動(dòng)力。但這中間暗藏隱患。再平衡要求中國降低投資增速。不良投資累積越多，就必須從家庭轉(zhuǎn)移出越多財(cái)富，來維持那些投資。然而，投資減少勢必導(dǎo)致經(jīng)濟(jì)增長驟然放緩。加快投資步伐是政策制定者維持經(jīng)濟(jì)高增長的唯一途徑。

　　This is why the debate within China has become so contentious. Reformers argue that the transition to a more sustainable growth model requires reduced investment – and slower GDP growth. Their opponents, who are concentrated in sectors of the economy that benefited from the growth model, do not see the link between rapid growth and low consumption. They argue for administrative steps to improve consumption without decelerating investment.

　　這就是中國國內(nèi)這場爭論變得如此激烈的原因所在。改革派認(rèn)為，要形成一種更可持續(xù)的增長模式，就必須減少投資，放慢經(jīng)濟(jì)增長步伐。反對(duì)者——主要集中在受益于現(xiàn)有增長模式的行業(yè)——則認(rèn)為高增長和低消費(fèi)之間不存在關(guān)聯(lián)。他們主張采取行政手段，在不導(dǎo)致投資減速的前提下擴(kuò)大消費(fèi)。

　　How quickly China resolves this debate is crucial. The historical precedents make it clear that once domestic imbalances are severe, the longer a country waits to adjust away from investment-driven growth, the more costly it is. But precedent also makes it clear how addictive the model can be. This is the challenge for China’s leadership. As long as investment grows quickly, it will require more subsidies from the household sector, and the household consumption share of GDP will stagnate. It is not until China makes the transition to a new growth model that rebalancing will begin.

　　中國何時(shí)能夠解決這場爭論至關(guān)重要。歷史先例表明，一旦國內(nèi)失衡達(dá)到嚴(yán)重程度，在改變投資驅(qū)動(dòng)型增長模式方面拖延的時(shí)間越長，為此付出的代價(jià)就越大。但是，歷史先例也讓我們知道了，這種模式會(huì)讓人多么上癮。這正是中國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層面臨的挑戰(zhàn)。只要投資還在迅速增長，就需要家庭部門提供更多補(bǔ)貼，家庭消費(fèi)占GDP的比重就將停滯不前。只有在中國開始朝著新增長模式轉(zhuǎn)變以后，再平衡才會(huì)啟動(dòng)。

　　The heated debate between the reformers, who are as unpopular as anyone who brings bad news tends to be, and those who see no reason to abandon a model that has generated such spectacular growth, has become one of the debates in the world. How quickly it is resolved will determine the pace and nature of China’s economic growth over the next several decades.

　　改革派（他們就像傳遞壞消息的信使一樣惹人討厭）和維護(hù)現(xiàn)有模式的陣營（他們認(rèn)為沒必要放棄一種帶來如此高速增長的模式）之間的激烈辯論，已經(jīng)成為一場世界級(jí)辯論。這場辯論何時(shí)落下帷幕，將決定未來幾十年中國經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的速度和性質(zhì)。

　　The writer is a finance professor at Peking University and a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment .

　　本文作者系北京大學(xué)金融學(xué)教授、卡內(nèi)基基金會(huì)(Carnegie Endowment)高級(jí)研究員。