It is not yet a flood, but the trickles eroding the walls that keep China’s currency within the country’s territory are beginning to add up to something.

　　這一切還算不上洪流，但侵蝕中國外匯管制“大壩”的涓涓細(xì)流正開始匯聚成有意義之舉。

　　Already last year, the renminbi debuted as a currency for bond financing by multinational corporations (McDonald’s); trade credits (to an Indonesian group by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China); and offshore deposit accounts (to the Bank of China’s personal banking clients in London, New York and other cities).

　　去年，人民幣已經(jīng)開始扮演了幾種新角色：跨國公司（麥當(dāng)勞(McDonald's)）的債券融資；貿(mào)易信貸（由中國工商銀行(ICBC)向一家印尼集團(tuán)提供）；以及海外儲(chǔ)蓄賬戶（面向中國銀行(BoC)在倫敦、紐約及其它一些城市的個(gè)人銀行客戶）。

　　Last week, further holes were pierced in the dam of non-convertibility. Pharo Management, a hedge fund manager, announced it will offer renminbi-denominated shares in its funds. The city of Wenzhou launched a pilot project to lighten restrictions on its residents’ ability to invest money offshore. And a year and a half after Chinese corporations were allowed to settle cross-border trades in their own currency, permission has also been granted to use renminbi to acquire or found new operations overseas.

　　上周，不可自由兌換的大壩上又被鑿出更多洞孔：對(duì)沖基金管理公司發(fā)邏資產(chǎn)管理(Pharo Management)宣布將發(fā)行旗下基金的人民幣計(jì)價(jià)股票；溫州市啟動(dòng)一個(gè)試點(diǎn)項(xiàng)目，減輕對(duì)市民投資海外的限制；還有，中國企業(yè)在獲準(zhǔn)以本幣結(jié)算跨境貿(mào)易一年半后，又獲準(zhǔn)使用人民幣在海外進(jìn)行收購或建立新業(yè)務(wù)。

　　That many of these moves make it easier to ship renminbi out of the country does not change the redback’s natural and favoured direction. If Chinese authorities were relaxing restrictions on capital inflows as freely as on outflows, the renminbi would have appreciated by more than the 3.5 per cent it has risen against the dollar since last year.

　　這些舉措中有不少都使人民幣更易流向海外，但這一事實(shí)改變不了人民幣受人青睞的自然流向。如果中國官方像對(duì)待資本流出那樣，放寬針對(duì)資本流入的限制，人民幣的升值幅度將超出其自去年以來兌美元逾3.5%的升幅。

　　The fact that markets are hungrier to send money into China than out of it is why Beijing will remain wary of going beyond baby steps in capital account liberalisation. A more convertible currency would leave only two alternatives in current market conditions: allow a much higher exchange rate or let in huge, and potentially destabilising, capital flows.

　　市場(chǎng)更渴望向中國輸送資金，而非把資金從中國轉(zhuǎn)移到海外，這就是北京方面在開放資本賬戶方面仍然只敢邁出小步的原因。在目前的市場(chǎng)狀況下，提高人民幣的可自由兌換程度只能帶來兩種選擇：一是允許匯率大幅提高，二是允許可能破壞穩(wěn)定的大規(guī)模資本流入。

　　Yet taking a longer view, it is inconceivable that a rising economic giant will forever content itself with a pygmy currency. As trade ties between China and other emerging countries deepen, why use a third country’s money to invoice their transactions? Renminbi-denominated trade is catching on fast, rising to some $50bn worth of deals in the past six months – from zero two years ago.

　　然而，從更長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)的視角看，難以想象一個(gè)不斷崛起的經(jīng)濟(jì)巨人會(huì)永遠(yuǎn)滿足于一種“侏儒貨幣”。隨著中國加深與其它新興國家的貿(mào)易聯(lián)系，有什么理由在開具貿(mào)易發(fā)票時(shí)要使用另一國的貨幣？人民幣計(jì)價(jià)的貿(mào)易正方興未艾，在過去6個(gè)月期間增至大約500億美元，而兩年前這個(gè)數(shù)字為零。

　　And twinkling on the horizon – and surely in some Politburo members’ minds – stands the prize of global reserve currency status. Yet that could come only, if ever, after full convertibility and radical changes to China’s capital markets. That way lie big risks, a fundamental transformation of the Chinese economy, and a loss of control that China’s leaders will not tolerate any time soon.

　　在地平線上（肯定也在某些政治局委員的腦海中）閃閃發(fā)光的，還有“全球儲(chǔ)備貨幣”地位這一榮耀。然而，要達(dá)到那一步，人民幣必須首先實(shí)現(xiàn)全面可自由兌換，中國的資本市場(chǎng)也必須先完成徹底改革。這條道路上潛藏著很大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，要求中國經(jīng)濟(jì)根本轉(zhuǎn)型，還意味著中國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人短時(shí)間內(nèi)不會(huì)容忍的失去控制權(quán)。