Much attention has centred on the ballooning debts owed by local governments in China to state banks. Less noticed, though, is the surge in defaults among a vast network of unregulated underground banks in recent months, a development that threatens to further crimp credit supplies to the private sector.

　　中國(guó)地方政府欠國(guó)有銀行的債務(wù)像吹氣球一樣不斷膨脹這一點(diǎn)備受關(guān)注，但人們較少注意到的是，在無(wú)人監(jiān)管的龐大地下錢(qián)莊網(wǎng)絡(luò)，近幾月來(lái)違約事件激增，這一趨勢(shì)恐將進(jìn)一步擠壓私人部門(mén)的信貸供給。

　　According to research over several months by FT China Confidential, non-performing loans at 50 underground banks surveyed in seven provinces have been climbing steadily since early 2011. In April, May and June, the proportion of underground banks reporting a rise in bad loans from the previous month were 22 per cent, 19 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively – representing clearly elevated levels from the near zero increases registered in the first two months of the year.

　　《中國(guó)投資參考》(FT China Confidential)歷時(shí)數(shù)月，在7個(gè)省份對(duì)50家左右的地下錢(qián)莊進(jìn)行了調(diào)查，發(fā)現(xiàn)越來(lái)越多的錢(qián)莊聲稱(chēng)壞賬有所增多。在4月、5月和6月，表示壞賬較上月增多的地下錢(qián)莊所占比例分別為22%、19%和15%，而今年頭兩個(gè)月增長(zhǎng)接近于零。

　　Underground banks inhabit the twilight of China’s financial system. Though unregulated and often unregistered, they regularly advertise for clients and depositors in local city newspapers. A couple of years ago, such adverts would typically be small, somewhat furtive notices offering “quick funds” next to a single mobile phone number.

　　地下錢(qián)莊棲居中國(guó)金融體系的模糊地帶，無(wú)人監(jiān)管，多為無(wú)照經(jīng)營(yíng)，但他們定期在地方城市的報(bào)紙上打廣告，招攬客戶(hù)和儲(chǔ)戶(hù)。兩三年前，這類(lèi)廣告往往是小打小鬧，只印一串手機(jī)號(hào)碼，后面寫(xiě)有提供“快捷資金”之類(lèi)的字眼，多少帶點(diǎn)偷偷摸摸的意味。

　　Since then, however, they have come a long way. The adverts in local city newspapers are now larger and bolder, with the mobile phone number often replaced by the name of an institution in large coloured print. “Easy Heaven Investments”, “Profits Quick”, “Treasure Beautiful Gold Credit Company” were three such names on a page full of underground bank adverts near the back of a recent edition of the Qingdao Metropolitan, a newspaper in the east coast city of Qingdao.

　　不過(guò)他們已經(jīng)今非昔比了。他們?cè)诘胤匠鞘袌?bào)紙上做的廣告不但篇幅大了許多，也更加明目張膽。以往寫(xiě)著手機(jī)號(hào)碼的位置，如今往往代之以大號(hào)彩色字體的機(jī)構(gòu)名稱(chēng)。青島最近一期《半島都市報(bào)》后面有一整版都是地下錢(qián)莊的廣告，例如“易天投資”、“盈馳”和“寶麗金”。

　　Because underground banks do not publish any financial numbers, the size of the sector is hard to estimate. However, China Confidential estimates that total lending from underground banks in 2010 ran to a few trillion renminbi, making the sector a vital source of credit to privately-owned SMEs (small and medium enterprises), which find it difficult to borrow from the state-dominated formal banking sector.

　　由于地下錢(qián)莊從不公布財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)字，這個(gè)行業(yè)的規(guī)模很難估計(jì)。不過(guò)，我們估計(jì)2010年中國(guó)地下錢(qián)莊總共發(fā)放了數(shù)萬(wàn)億元人民幣貸款。對(duì)難以從政府主導(dǎo)的正規(guī)銀行貸到資金的民營(yíng)中小企業(yè)來(lái)說(shuō)，地下錢(qián)莊是一個(gè)極其重要的信貸來(lái)源。

　　The spike in bad debts has come as many private enterprises have been hard hit by rising costs of labour, power, property rent, land rent, water, transports and several other key business inputs. In an effort to curb such inflation, Beijing has raised formal bank interest rates five times since October 2010 and increased the amount of funds that banks must hold on reserve at the central bank on numerous occasions.

　　目前地下錢(qián)莊之所以壞賬激增，根源在于勞動(dòng)力、電力、房租、地租、水、運(yùn)輸及其它各項(xiàng)關(guān)鍵生產(chǎn)成本節(jié)節(jié)攀升，對(duì)許多民營(yíng)企業(yè)造成了嚴(yán)重沖擊。正是為了遏制通脹，中國(guó)自2010年10月以來(lái)5次上調(diào)了正式銀行利率，并多次調(diào)高銀行存款準(zhǔn)備金率。

　　However, such moves have served to accentuate the credit squeeze felt by private enterprises, and underground banks have hiked lending rates accordingly. In Zhejiang Province, known for its vibrant private sector, underground money shops are charging 6 per cent to 8 percent a month (84 per cent to 104 per cent a year) for loans with valid collateral such as housing or blue chip stocks, and up to 15 per cent a month for loans without collateral. In contrast, the benchmark lending rate from formal banks is 6.56 per cent a year.

　　可是這些舉措更加使民營(yíng)企業(yè)感受到了信貸緊縮，而地下銀行也相應(yīng)地上調(diào)了貸款利率。在以私營(yíng)經(jīng)濟(jì)蓬勃發(fā)展著稱(chēng)的浙江省，以住房或藍(lán)籌股作抵押向地下錢(qián)莊貸款，月息介于6%至8%（相當(dāng)于年息84%至104%）；而無(wú)抵押貸款的月息最高可達(dá)15%。相比之下，正規(guī)銀行的基準(zhǔn)年貸款利率為6.56%。

　　The sharp increase in credit costs to private enterprises have hit profit margins, with manufacturers in Guangdong province, an export powerhouse dominated by private companies, reporting only a 10.4 percent increase in profit in the first quarter of this year, down from a 36.5 per cent rise in the same period a year earlier.

　　信貸成本大幅攀升擠壓了民營(yíng)企業(yè)的利潤(rùn)率。在以民營(yíng)企業(yè)為主體的出口大省廣東省，制造業(yè)企業(yè)今年一季度的利潤(rùn)僅增長(zhǎng)了10.4%，增幅遠(yuǎn)低于去年同期的36.5%。

　　The problem is made worse by manufacturers’ deteriorating cash flow that puts their survival at risk. Rather than allowing credit sales, upstream suppliers are asking for one-time cash payments before shipping goods out. In the mean time, factories are spending several months longer getting paid by downstream clients who are facing a buildup of unsold inventory.

　　更糟糕的是，由于現(xiàn)金流持續(xù)惡化，許多制造業(yè)企業(yè)連生存都成問(wèn)題。上游供貨商再也不允許欠款，而要求資金一次到位，之后才會(huì)發(fā)貨。與此同時(shí)，工廠則要多等幾個(gè)月才能收到下游客戶(hù)的款項(xiàng)，而后者倉(cāng)庫(kù)里沒(méi)賣(mài)出去的存貨越積越多。

　　This combined has raised red flags for underground banks. The number of litigations regarding underground lending default jumped 22 percent in Wenzhou, one of China’s most capitalist cities, in the first five months of this year compared to the same period a year earlier, according to a local court. Although most borrowers could still make ends meet, the few who fail are often a victim of exorbitant borrowing costs.

　　這一切都給地下錢(qián)莊拉響了警報(bào)。在中國(guó)最具資本主義色彩的城市之一溫州，據(jù)一家地方法院透露，今年頭5個(gè)月，全市與民間借貸相關(guān)的違約訴訟案件同比增加了22%。雖然說(shuō)大多數(shù)貸款者都還能把日子過(guò)下去，但那些占少數(shù)的倒閉者往往是貸款成本過(guò)高的犧牲品。

　　Deer Electronics, a refrigerator maker in the eastern Jiaxing City, filed in April for bankruptcy after defaulting on an Rmb70m loan from underground lenders that was agreed at 7 percent interest a month.

　　嘉興市冰箱廠商德?tīng)栯娖?Deer Electronics)因拖欠地下錢(qián)莊一筆月息7%的7000萬(wàn)元人民幣貸款，已于4月申請(qǐng)破產(chǎn)。

　　But in spite of the increase in bankruptcies and distressed borrowers, depositors remain eager to park their funds with underground banks because of the lucrative interest rates offered and the fact that formal state banks savers are currently earning sharply negative real returns. To manage funds for wealthy clients, a money broker in Zhejiang Province said he had to promise more than 20 per cent in annual interest, or around 6 times the benchmark deposit rate.

　　然而，盡管越來(lái)越多的企業(yè)不是破產(chǎn)就是處境艱難，儲(chǔ)戶(hù)仍然熱衷于把錢(qián)存在地下錢(qián)莊，原因有兩點(diǎn)：一是地下錢(qián)莊提供的利率實(shí)在誘人，二是正規(guī)銀行存款的實(shí)際利率是個(gè)不小的負(fù)值。浙江一位從事短期借貸中介業(yè)務(wù)的經(jīng)紀(jì)人表示，為了給有錢(qián)客戶(hù)管理資金，他不得不許下年息20%以上的承諾，這大致相當(dāng)于基準(zhǔn)存款利率的6倍。

　　It is likely that the stress evident in the underground banking sector could mount in coming months. Lenders in Hangzhou, an eastern city, voiced concerns about loans to property developers and small exporters after some of them invested borrowed funds in stock futures to earn a quick buck.

　　地下錢(qián)莊已經(jīng)面臨不小的壓力，未來(lái)幾個(gè)月，這種壓力可能會(huì)進(jìn)一步加大。杭州一些地下錢(qián)莊就表示為發(fā)放給房地產(chǎn)開(kāi)發(fā)商和小型出口企業(yè)的貸款感到擔(dān)心，因?yàn)槠渲杏行┤税呀鑱?lái)的錢(qián)拿去投資股票期貨，就為了快點(diǎn)來(lái)錢(qián)。

　　The best way to keep private lenders from blowing up, said He Zhicheng of the Agricultural Bank of China in an article, is to lift interest rate controls so formal banks could price the cost of capital according to market risks. But to do so would require “a big raise in lending rates to state firms”, which may also cause non-performing loans to jump.

　　中國(guó)農(nóng)業(yè)銀行(Agricultural Bank of China)的何志成撰文表示，“打擊高利貸市場(chǎng)的最好方法是”取消利率管制，使正規(guī)銀行能夠按照市場(chǎng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的高低對(duì)資金成本進(jìn)行定價(jià)。但這樣做的前提必然是“大幅度提高國(guó)有企業(yè)的貸款利率”，而這也可能導(dǎo)致大面積壞賬。

　　“This is a big paradox,” wrote He.

　　“這是一個(gè)極大的悖論。”