The first half of 2011 showed a slowdown of growth – if not outright contraction – in most advanced economies. Optimists said this was a temporary soft patch. This delusion has been dashed. Even before last week’s panic, the US and other advanced economies were odds-on for a second severe recession.

　　2011年上半年，大多數(shù)發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體的增長都出現(xiàn)了減速——如果說不是直截了當(dāng)?shù)奈s。樂觀主義者表示，這種增長疲軟只是暫時現(xiàn)象。可如今這種錯覺已然破滅。甚至在上周的恐慌出現(xiàn)之前，美國和其它發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體就很可能再度陷入嚴(yán)重的衰退。

　　America’s recent data have been lousy: there has been little job creation, weak growth and flat consumption and manufacturing production. Housing remains depressed. Consumer, business and investor confidence has been falling, and will now fall further.

　　美國近期發(fā)布的各項(xiàng)經(jīng)濟(jì)數(shù)據(jù)都很糟糕：新創(chuàng)造的就業(yè)崗位幾乎為零，增長乏力，消費(fèi)和工業(yè)生產(chǎn)疲軟。住宅市場仍萎靡不振。消費(fèi)者、企業(yè)和投資者信心不斷減弱，今后還將進(jìn)一步走低。

　　Across the Atlantic the eurozone periphery is now contracting, or barely growing at best. The risk that Italy or Spain – and perhaps both – will lose access to debt markets is now very high. Unlike Greece, Portugal and Ireland these two countries are too?big to be bailed out.

　　在大西洋彼岸，歐元區(qū)外圍國家也在不斷萎縮，說得好聽一點(diǎn)，幾乎沒有增長可言。目前，意大利或西班牙（或者兩國同時）喪失通過債市融資資格的可能性非常大。與希臘、葡萄牙和愛爾蘭不同，這兩個國家規(guī)模太大，難以為其紓困。

　　Meanwhile, the UK has seen flat growth as austerity bites, and structurally stagnating Japan will recover for a few quarters – after double-dipping after the earthquake – only to stagnate again as the stimulus fizzles out. Even worse, leading indicators of global manufacturing are slowing sharply – both in the emerging economies like China, India and Brazil, and export-oriented or resource-rich countries such as Germany and Australia.

　　與此同時，在緊縮措施的作用下，英國的增長一直萎靡不振，而結(jié)構(gòu)性發(fā)展停滯、又在地震后二次探底的日本經(jīng)濟(jì)，將在未來幾個季度恢復(fù)一定的元?dú)猓S著刺激計(jì)劃到期，經(jīng)濟(jì)只會再次陷入停滯。更糟糕的是，全球制造業(yè)的領(lǐng)先指標(biāo)也在明顯減速——無論是在中國、印度和巴西等新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體，還是在德國和澳大利亞等出口導(dǎo)向型或資源豐富的國家皆是如此。

　　Until last year policymakers could always produce a new rabbit from their hat to trigger asset reflation and economic recovery. Zero policy rates, QE1, QE2, credit easing, fiscal stimulus, ring-fencing, liquidity provision to the tune of trillions of dollars and bailing out banks and financial institutions – all have been tried. But now we have run out of rabbits to reveal.

　　直到去年，政策制定者還總能像變戲法一樣，從自己的“帽子”里不停地變出新的“兔子”，以刺激資產(chǎn)再膨脹和經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇。零政策利率、定量寬松、二次定量寬松、信貸寬松、財政刺激、隔離政策、高達(dá)數(shù)萬億美元的流動性、為銀行和金融機(jī)構(gòu)提供紓困——他們試遍了一切手段。但現(xiàn)在，我們再也沒有“兔子”可變了。

　　The misguided decision by Standard & Poor’s to downgrade the US at a time of such severe market turmoil and economic weakness only increases the chances of a double dip and even larger fiscal deficits. Paradoxically, however, US Treasuries will probably remain the world’s least ugly safe asset: risk aversion, equity declines and a looming slump could even see treasury yields fall rather than rise.

　　標(biāo)普(S&P)在市場動蕩和經(jīng)濟(jì)疲弱如此嚴(yán)峻的時刻下調(diào)美國信用評級的決定十分不明智，這只會加大美國經(jīng)濟(jì)出現(xiàn)雙底衰退、財政赤字進(jìn)一步擴(kuò)大的可能性。然而矛盾的是，美國國債很可能仍將是世界上最令人放心的安全資產(chǎn)：投資者規(guī)避風(fēng)險、股市下跌、經(jīng)濟(jì)即將陷入低迷，這一切甚至可能導(dǎo)致美國國債收益率下降、而非上升。

　　Fiscal policy is now contractionary in both the eurozone and the UK. Even in the US the issue is only the amount of drag, as state and local authorities, and now the federal government, cut spending, reduce transfer payments and (soon enough) raise taxes. Another round of bank bail-outs is politically unacceptable. But even if it were not, most countries, especially in Europe, are so distressed that their sovereign risk is actually leading to banking risk – as banks are loaded up with distressed government debt.

　　如今，無論是歐元區(qū)還是英國，財政政策都在收縮。即使在美國，問題也只是財政收縮的規(guī)模，各州及地方相關(guān)當(dāng)局都在削減支出，轉(zhuǎn)移支付，并（很快將）增稅，現(xiàn)在連聯(lián)邦政府也開始這樣做了。對銀行實(shí)施新一輪紓困在政治上讓人無法接受。但即便可以接受，大多數(shù)國家，尤其是歐洲國家，都已深陷困境——由于銀行里塞滿不良政府債務(wù)，它們的主權(quán)風(fēng)險實(shí)際上將引發(fā)銀行業(yè)危機(jī)。

　　Hopes for quantitative easing will be constrained by inflation that is well above target levels across the west. The Federal Reserve will probably start a third round of QE, but it will be too little too late. Last year’s $600bn QE2 (along with $1,000bn of tax cuts and transfers) produced a growth bump of barely 3 per cent, for one quarter. QE3 will be much smaller, and will do much less.

　　出臺定量寬松政策的希望，將因整個西方的通脹遠(yuǎn)高于目標(biāo)水平而受限。美聯(lián)儲(Fed)很可能會啟動第三輪定量寬松政策，但只會是杯水車薪，也為時已晚。去年總規(guī)模為6000億美元的二次定量寬松（加上1萬億美元的減稅和轉(zhuǎn)移支付），結(jié)果也僅僅是刺激一個季度增長3%。三次定量寬松的規(guī)模將小得多，效果也要差很多。

　　Nor will exports help. All advanced nations need a weaker currency, but they cannot all have it together – if one is weaker another has to be stronger. This is a zero sum game which risks only the resumption of currency wars. Early skirmishes are beginning as Japan and Switzerland try to weaken their exchange rates. Others will soon follow.

　　 出口也幫不上忙。所有發(fā)達(dá)國家都需要貨幣貶值，但它們無法同時這樣做——一國貨幣走弱，就必須有一國貨幣走強(qiáng)。這是一個零和游戲，只會再一次挑起貨幣戰(zhàn)爭。隨著日本和瑞士試圖壓低本幣匯率，早期小規(guī)模沖突已然爆發(fā)。其它國家很快也將加以效仿。

　　So can we avoid another severe recession? It might simply be mission impossible. The best bet is for those countries that have not lost market access – the US, UK, Japan, and Germany – to introduce new short-term fiscal stimulus while committing to medium-term fiscal austerity. The US downgrade will hasten demands for fiscal reduction, but America in particular should commit to look for significant cuts in the medium term, not an immediate fiscal drag that will worsen growth and deficits.

　　那么，我們能否避免又一次的嚴(yán)重衰退？這或許是不可能完成的任務(wù)。最好的辦法是，那些仍可以通過市場融資的國家——美國、英國、日本和德國——推出新的短期財政刺激，同時承諾在中期內(nèi)實(shí)施財政緊縮。美國信用遭降級將加速對財政縮減的需求，但美國尤其應(yīng)該承諾在中期內(nèi)大幅削減支出，而不是立即實(shí)施只會讓增長和赤字惡化的財政收縮。

　　Most western central banks should also introduce further QE, even though its effect will be limited. The European Central Bank should not just stop rate hiking: it should cut rates to zero and make big purchases of government bonds to prevent Italy or Spain losing market access – the outcome of which would be a truly major crisis, requiring doubling (or tripling) of bail-out resources, or debt workouts and a eurozone break-up.

　　大多數(shù)西方央行也應(yīng)出臺新一輪定量寬松，即便其效果有限。歐洲央行(ECB)不應(yīng)僅僅是停止加息：它應(yīng)該將利率削減至零，并大舉購入政府債券，以防意大利或西班牙無法通過市場融資——這兩國如果無法通過市場融資，結(jié)果將演變?yōu)橐粓稣嬲龂?yán)重的危機(jī)，需要將紓困資源增加一倍（或兩倍），否則將導(dǎo)致債務(wù)整肅和歐元區(qū)解體。

　　Finally, since this is a crisis of solvency as well as liquidity, orderly debt restructuring must begin. This means across the board reduction on the mortgage debt for the roughly half of America’s households that are underwater, and bail-ins for creditors of banks in distress. Greek-style coercive maturity extensions, at risk free rates, must also come for Portugal and Ireland, with Italy and Spain to follow if they lose market access. Another recession may not be preventable. But policy can stop a second depression. That is reason enough for swift and targeted action.

　　最后，由于這場危機(jī)實(shí)際上既是償付能力危機(jī)，也是流動性危機(jī)，各國必須啟動有序的債務(wù)重組。這意味著全面縮減大約半數(shù)苦苦掙扎的美國家庭的抵押貸款債務(wù)，讓陷入困境的銀行的債權(quán)人認(rèn)虧自救。葡萄牙和愛爾蘭也必須效仿希臘，以無風(fēng)險的利率，強(qiáng)制延長債務(wù)到期時間，如果意大利和西班牙喪失從市場融資的資格，它們也必須這樣做。又一場衰退或許是無法避免的。但有效的政策可以避免經(jīng)濟(jì)再次陷入蕭條。僅憑這一點(diǎn)，各國政府就應(yīng)該迅速采取有針對性的行動。