The only good thing about the continuing barrage of bad economic news is that it could have been worse: all three rating agencies could have downgraded the US, stock markets could have fallen further and the US could have defaulted on its debt. The general view is now that in this, the next round of the Great Recession, there is a high risk of things getting worse, with no effective instruments at governments’ disposal. The first point is correct but the second is not quite right.

　　最近一連串經(jīng)濟壞消息中蘊含的唯一好消息是，情況本來可能更糟：三大評級機構(gòu)本來都可能調(diào)降美國的評級，股市本來可能下跌得更厲害，美國本來可能出現(xiàn)債務(wù)違約。人們普遍認為，在“大衰退”(Great Recession)發(fā)展到眼下這一最新階段時，情況惡化的可能性非常高，而政府手中卻沒什么行之有效的政策工具。這一觀點的第一部分是對的，第二部分則不完全對。

　　Throughout the crisis – and before it – Keynesian economists provided a coherent interpretation of events. Pre-crisis, America, and to a large extent the world economy, was sustained by a bubble. The breaking of the bubble has left a legacy of excess leverage and real estate. Consumption will therefore remain weak and austerity on both sides of the Atlantic now ensures the state will not fill the void. Given this, it is not surprising that companies are unwilling to invest – even those that can get access to capital.

　　整個危機期間、以及危機之前，凱恩斯主義經(jīng)濟學家就事態(tài)的發(fā)展給出了條理清晰的解釋。危機前，美國經(jīng)濟是由泡沫支撐的，全球經(jīng)濟大體上也是如此。泡沫破裂后，留下的是過量的杠桿和房地產(chǎn)。因此，消費將持續(xù)疲軟，而大西洋兩岸現(xiàn)在實施的財政緊縮又使得政府無法去填補消費疲軟留下的需求缺口。鑒于此種情況，企業(yè)不愿意投資就不足為奇了——即使那些能夠獲得資本的企業(yè)也不愿投資。

　　Of course, those worried about the shortage of policy instruments are partially correct. Bad monetary policy got us into this mess but it cannot get us out. Even if the inflation hawks at the Federal Reserve can be subdued, a third bout of quantitative easing will be even less effective than QE2. Even that probably did more to contribute to bubbles in emerging markets, while not leading to much additional lending or investment at home.

　　當然，那些擔心政府手中缺少政策工具的人在一部分程度上是正確的。糟糕的貨幣政策讓我們陷入當前的困局，卻不能將我們拉出去。即使美聯(lián)儲(Fed)內(nèi)的通脹鷹派人士能夠被降伏，第三輪定量寬松(QE3)也只會比第二輪(QE2)更加低效。即便是QE2，恐怕更多的作用也只是吹大了新興市場的泡沫，而不是給美國國內(nèi)帶來多少新的貸款或投資。

　　But there is an answer, at least for countries such as the US that can borrow at low rates: use the money to make high-return investments. This will both promote growth and generate tax revenues, lowering debt to gross domestic product ratios in the medium term and increasing debt sustainability. Even given the same budget situation, restructuring spending and taxes towards growth – by lowering payroll taxes, increasing taxes on the rich, as well as lowering taxes for corporations that invest and raising them on those that do not – can improve debt sustainability.

　　但解決辦法是存在的，至少對像美國這樣能夠以低利率借債的國家來說是如此：拿錢去做高回報的投資。這既能促進經(jīng)濟增長，又能帶來稅收，從而在中期內(nèi)降低債務(wù)相對國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的比率，并提升債務(wù)的可維持性。即使在同樣的預算情況下，對支出和稅收進行結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整、使之能夠促進增長，也可提升債務(wù)的可維持性。這些調(diào)整包括降低工資稅、對富人增稅、對做出投資的企業(yè)減稅、對不做出投資的企業(yè)增稅。

　　The politics, however, are elsewhere. Markets know that the mix of low tax and debt fetishism sweeping the North Atlantic means that there are no instruments at hand: monetary policy won’t work, fiscal policy is constrained, growth will slow and the improvement in deficits (brought by austerity) will be disappointing.

　　不過，其他地方卻存在著斗爭。市場知道，在北大西洋大行其道的低稅收和舉債癖組合意味著，政府手中沒有什么立刻可用的政策工具：貨幣政策將毫無收效，財政政策受到限制，經(jīng)濟增長將會放緩，減赤效果（依靠財政緊縮）將令人失望。

　　But markets have a political agenda too, clearly evident in S&P’s downgrade. No economist would look just at the debt side of a balance sheet, yet that is what S&P focuses on. Even more telling is the fact that the US pays its debts in dollars, and it controls the printing presses. There is thus no chance of a default – apart from the kind of political charade we saw last week.

　　然而市場也有一項斗爭任務(wù)，這在標準普爾(S&P)調(diào)降美國評級事件中表現(xiàn)得很明顯。沒有哪位經(jīng)濟學家會只看資產(chǎn)負債表的負債一側(cè)，但這卻是標準普爾的關(guān)注焦點。更能說明問題的是，美國是用美元償還債務(wù)，而它手中掌控著印美元的機器。因此，美國根本不可能發(fā)生債務(wù)違約——我們上周看到的那類假戲真做的政治秀不算數(shù)。

　　Markets are often wrong but the rating firms’ record does not inspire confidence – certainly not to justify replacing the aggregate views of millions with judgments of a few “technicians” working in a firm whose governance and incentives are problematic. Europe’s leaders were right in their recent meeting to call for less reliance on these ratings.

　　市場經(jīng)常犯錯，但評級機構(gòu)的過往記錄無法喚起人們對這些機構(gòu)的信心。用少數(shù)“專家”的判斷代替無數(shù)人的綜合觀點——而這些專家是供職于一家治理和激勵都成問題的機構(gòu)——這顯然無法令人信服。歐洲領(lǐng)導人最近在會議中呼吁減少對這些評級的依賴，這是正確的。

　　Europe and America now face extraordinarily difficult politics. It is hard to know which is worse: America’s gridlock, or Europe’s broken political structure. Europe’s leaders have taken decisive action but events move faster than their processes of ratification and implementation. Europe’s debt-to-GDP ratio is also lower than in the US; if it had an adequate common fiscal framework, it would be in a better position than America, too.

　　歐洲和美國現(xiàn)在面臨極端困難的政治局面。很難說哪邊的情況更糟糕：是美國的僵局，還是歐洲支離破碎的政治結(jié)構(gòu)？歐洲領(lǐng)導人已經(jīng)采取果斷行動，但事態(tài)的發(fā)展要快于他們批準和實施對策的進程。歐洲債務(wù)相對GDP的比率也低于美國；如果其財政框架足夠統(tǒng)一，其財政狀況也會好于美國。

　　Europe’s other problem is too many think fiscal stringency is now the answer. Yet Ireland and Spain had a surplus and low debt-to-GDP ratios before the crisis. More austerity will only ensure that Europe grows more slowly and its fiscal problems will mount. Only latterly have Europe’s leaders finally recognised that Greece and the other crisis-plagued countries needed growth – and that austerity would also never bring that growth.

　　 歐洲的另一個問題是，有太多人認為財政緊縮是當下的靈丹妙藥。然而在危機前，愛爾蘭和西班牙的財政處在盈余狀態(tài)，債務(wù)相對GDP的比率也很低。更多的財政緊縮只會使歐洲的經(jīng)濟增長變得更加緩慢、財政問題越積越多。直到最近，歐洲領(lǐng)導人才終于認識到，希臘和其他被危機困擾的國家需要經(jīng)濟增長——而財政緊縮永遠不會帶來這種增長。

　　All of this makes it more likely that the North Atlantic will enter a double dip, but there is also nothing magic about the number zero. The critical growth rate is that which stops the jobs deficit growing larger. Problematically, America and Europe’s current growth rate of about one per cent is less than half of the amount required to do this.

　　上述這一切加大了北大西洋步入雙底衰退的可能性，不過，關(guān)注經(jīng)濟增長率是否大于零并沒有太大的意義。關(guān)鍵的增長率是使得就業(yè)崗位缺口不再擴大的經(jīng)濟增長率。在這方面美國和歐洲都成問題，兩者當前的增長率約為1%，要提高一倍以上才能做到上面這一點。

　　When the recession began there were many wise words about having learnt the lessons of both the Great Depression and Japan’s long malaise. Now we know we didn’t learn a thing. Our stimulus was too weak, too short and not well designed. The banks weren’t forced to return to lending. Our leaders tried papering over the economy’s weaknesses – perhaps out of fear that if we were honest about them, already fragile confidence would erode. But that was a gamble we have now lost. Now the scale of the problem is apparent, a new confidence has emerged: confidence that matters will get worse, whatever action we take. A long malaise now seems like the optimistic scenario.

　　當這次衰退開始之時，許多人都頭頭是道地表示已從大蕭條(Great Depression)和日本的長期經(jīng)濟低迷中吸取了教訓?，F(xiàn)在我們知道，我們什么都沒有吸取。我們實施的刺激力度太弱、持續(xù)時間太短，并且沒有好好規(guī)劃。我們沒有敦促銀行恢復放貸。我們的領(lǐng)導人則試圖掩蓋經(jīng)濟存在的缺陷——這或許是出于這樣一種恐懼，即如果對公眾如實相告，那么已然脆弱不堪的信心將會消失殆盡。但是，這是一場我們現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)輸?shù)舻馁€博。如今，問題的嚴重性有目共睹，人們已經(jīng)產(chǎn)生了一種新的信心：即相信無論我們采取什么措施，情況都會惡化?，F(xiàn)在看起來，經(jīng)濟長期低迷好像還是一個樂觀的前景。