In June 2009, Hong Kong-based Bank of East Asia announced it was selling a 70 per cent stake in its Canadian operations to the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the largest of China’s state-owned banks. Approval from the Canadian authorities was not an issue. Then in January of this year, Bank of East Asia announced it was selling 80 per cent of its business in the US – which consists of a network of only 13 branches in New York and California – to ICBC.

　　2009年6月，香港東亞銀行(Bank of East Asia)宣布，擬將旗下加拿大業(yè)務(wù)70%的股權(quán)售予中國最大的國有銀行中國工商銀行(ICBC)。此筆交易順利獲得了加拿大當(dāng)局的批準(zhǔn)。今年1月，東亞銀行又宣布，擬將美國業(yè)務(wù)（僅包括紐約和加州的13家分行） 80%的股權(quán)出售給工行。

　　That deal, however, is still awaiting approval, and nobody is certain what the timing is. For months the deal has been pending before the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), the interdepartmental government agency reviewing foreign acquisitions. (The deal still requires Federal Reserve approval as well.)

　　不過，此筆交易還在等待審批，沒人知道何時會有結(jié)果。它在美國外國投資委員會(Cfius)手里已經(jīng)押了好幾個月。外國投資委員會是一家負(fù)責(zé)審查外國收購交易的跨部門政府機(jī)構(gòu)。（該交易也需要獲得美聯(lián)儲(Federal Reserve)的批準(zhǔn)。）

　　Arguably CFIUS should not be reviewing the potential purchase at all. It is supposed to vet deals only when there are national security issues. Nobody questions the ultimate outcome, since approval is expected. It is the process with which the Chinese are taking issue. Chinese bankers and investors say the investment landscape in China is more transparent and fair than that of the US, a charge that is given weight by CFIUS operating without any transparency at all. (Treasury officials cite the need for secrecy given the market-sensitive nature of the information the committee handles.)

　　說起來，外國投資委員會根本就不應(yīng)該審查此筆潛在交易。照例說，只有在涉及國家安全時，才需要該機(jī)構(gòu)的審核。沒人懷疑最終審查結(jié)果，人們認(rèn)為此筆交易肯定會獲得批準(zhǔn)。中方存在異議的是過程。中國的銀行家和投資者表示，中國的投資環(huán)境比美國更透明、更公正。美國外國投資委員會在運(yùn)作中毫無透明度可言，坐實(shí)了這一指控。（美國財政部官員辯稱，考慮到該委員會所處理信息的市場敏感性，保密是必要的。）

　　The Chinese perception that the US is hostile to Chinese buyers of hard assets can only be a bad thing. At some point, which is likely to come sooner rather than later, China’s appetite for financial assets will diminish.

　　在中方看來，美國對收購硬資產(chǎn)的中國買家懷有敵意，這種感覺有弊無利。有朝一日，中國對金融資產(chǎn)的胃口將會徹底消失。只怕這一天會來得太早，而不是太晚。

　　In the year to date, inbound investment into China totalled $33.3bn with $5.8bn of that coming from the US, according to data from Dealogic. The US was the second-largest acquirer. But, so far, outbound Chinese investment into the US is a fraction of what most bankers expect it will soon be or what investment into China is. The US was in 10th place for outward acquisitions from China, with a total deal value of $958m, of which more than half was accounted for by a single transaction, CNOOC’s $570m purchase of a stake in Chesapeake Energy shale oil and gas leases in January, according to Thomson Reuters.

　　根據(jù)Dealogic的數(shù)據(jù)，今年迄今為止，外國對華投資額為333億美元，其中58億美元來自美國。美國是第二大買家。然而，迄今為止中國在美國的投資，僅為大多數(shù)銀行家所預(yù)期將很快達(dá)到的數(shù)額的一小部分，也僅為流入中國投資的一小部分。湯森路透(Thomson Reuters)的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，在中國的對外收購中，美國排在第10位，總交易金額為9.58億美元，其中，中海油(CNOOC)今年1月以5.7億美元收購Chesapeake Energy頁巖油氣項(xiàng)目部分權(quán)益的交易，就占到半數(shù)以上。

　　Given the assumption that the dollar will depreciate and that the US government will issue far more debt to inflate its way out of its fiscal hole, investors from abroad are likely to seek to purchase more hard assets and fewer financial investments.

　　由于認(rèn)為美元將會貶值，而美國政府將大幅提高債券發(fā)行量，以通過通脹彌補(bǔ)其財政缺口，海外投資者可能會尋求購買更多的硬資產(chǎn)，并減少金融投資的數(shù)量。

　　Meanwhile, the Chinese government’s concern with the riskiness of financial assets in the US is clear. It has already trimmed its purchases of the debt of the mortgage agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as corporate debt and shares, concentrating its purchases in Treasuries alone. Moreover, China has not hesitated to communicate its displeasure with US policies and politics. After the debt rating downgrade earlier this month, China was vocal in noting that the country could no longer “borrow its way out of messes of its own making”.

　　與此同時，中國政府對于在美金融資產(chǎn)風(fēng)險的擔(dān)憂十分明顯。中國已削減了對按揭機(jī)構(gòu)房利美(Fannie Mae)和房地美(Freddie Mac)債券、以及企業(yè)債券和股票的購買量，將購買活動集中在美國國債一項(xiàng)。此外，中國毫不猶豫地表達(dá)了對于美國政策與政治的不悅。在本月初美國國債信用評級下調(diào)后，中國曾公開表態(tài)，指出美國“依靠舉債就能擺脫自己制造的麻煩的時代已經(jīng)結(jié)束了”。

　　China continues to export to the rest of the world and today sits on $3,200bn in reserves. Recently though, the US strategy of printing dollars and presenting the world, most especially China, with a trade-off between maintaining their currencies at current levels and fuelling inflation or letting their currencies move up seems to be paying off. The dollar share of the Chinese government’s foreign assets is already dropping, down from 71 percent of the total in 2005 to 60 per cent now, according to data from the Council on Foreign Relations.

　　中國仍在繼續(xù)向其他國家出口商品，目前坐擁3.2萬億美元外匯儲備。不過近來，美國印制美元并以此迫使全世界，尤其是中國，面臨兩難局面——要么將匯率維持在當(dāng)前水平并推高通脹，要么讓本幣升值——的策略，最近似乎產(chǎn)生了效果。美國外交關(guān)系委員會(Council on Foreign Relations)的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，美元在中國政府外匯資產(chǎn)中所占的份額已出現(xiàn)下降，從2005年的占總金額的71%，下降到了目前的60%。

　　In the past few weeks, China has also let its currency appreciate at a swifter rate. As that trend continues, assets abroad, especially in the US, will become ever more of a bargain. 過去幾周，中國也已經(jīng)加快人民幣的升值步伐。隨著這一趨勢的繼續(xù)，海外資產(chǎn)，尤其是在美國的資產(chǎn)，將變得比以往更加廉價。

　　US bankers dismiss Chinese claims that the US has a less transparent regime than China, pointing out that China too has a body that screens transactions and can be equally arbitrary and unpredictable. But the perceptions of a creditor nation will always matter more than those of a debtor one. Over time China will target more US acquisitions and the US will just have to get used to it. The fact that beggars cannot be choosers is true for nations as well as individuals.

　　對于中國所稱美國機(jī)制透明度不及中國的說法，美國銀行業(yè)者不以為然，他們指出，中國也有一家負(fù)責(zé)審批交易的機(jī)構(gòu)，也會一樣隨意行事、無法預(yù)測。然而，債權(quán)國的看法總是比債務(wù)國更為重要。隨著時間的推移，中國將會著眼于在美國進(jìn)行更多并購，而美國必須要習(xí)慣這一點(diǎn)。要飯的不能挑三揀四的道理，無論對人還是對國家，都是成立的。