"When a company’s numbers look too good, they often are,” says Bank of America Merrill Lynch. That’s easy to say, but often harder to prove.

　　美銀美林（Bank of America Merrill Lynch）說(shuō)，當(dāng)一家公司的財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)看上去過(guò)于漂亮?xí)r，他們往往是……。不過(guò)這話說(shuō)的容易，想要證實(shí)卻比較困難。

　　But thanks to BofA-ML’s guidelines, now anybody can engage in a bit of sleuthing, Muddy Waters style. Focusing on 32 Chinese companies listed in the U.S., Hong Kong and China where there were publicly disclosed details regarding fraud, BofA-ML says there are three common accounting frauds and three common ways of finding out.

　　Everett Collection多虧了美銀美林的指導(dǎo)，現(xiàn)在任何人都可以從事一些偵查工作，而且風(fēng)格類似獨(dú)立調(diào)查公司Muddy Waters。在集中研究了32家在美國(guó)、香港和中國(guó)上市的中資企業(yè)之后，美銀美林說(shuō)，市場(chǎng)上有三類常見(jiàn)的會(huì)計(jì)欺詐行為，也有三種常見(jiàn)的方法可以查出這些行為。上述三地市場(chǎng)均對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)欺詐進(jìn)行公開(kāi)披露。

　　The “three common manipulations”:

　　下面是三種常見(jiàn)的股價(jià)操縱行為：

　　1. Sales to non-existing customers.

　　1. 向子虛烏有的客戶銷售產(chǎn)品

　　Example: RINO International Corp. admitted in March that at least two of its manufacturing contracts didn’t exist after a report issued by Muddy Waters (yes, them again) in November 2010. The Chinese equipment maker was suspended by the Securities and Exchange Commission in April after RINO failed to disclose to shareholders that investigators looking into fraud allegations at the company had resigned.

　　例子：Muddy Waters（是的，又是他們）在2010年11月發(fā)布了一份報(bào)告之后，綠諾國(guó)際有限公司（RINO International Corp.）今年3月承認(rèn)，該公司至少有兩份制造合同根本不存在。今年4月，美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)（Securities and Exchange Commission，簡(jiǎn)稱：SEC）暫停了綠諾國(guó)際這家設(shè)備制造商的股票交易。此前該公司沒(méi)有向股東披露正在調(diào)查欺詐指控的調(diào)查人員已經(jīng)辭職的事實(shí)。

　　2. Inflating sales and cost of goods via related party transactions.

　　2. 通過(guò)關(guān)聯(lián)方交易夸大銷量和產(chǎn)品成本

　　Example: New York-listed Duoyuan Global Water Inc. faced lawsuits late last year alleging, among other things, the existence of accounting improprieties. Regulators suspended the stock from trading in March, as the company failed to bring its filings to the SEC up to date. A Muddy Waters report in April later said Duoyuan engaged in “improper undisclosed related party transactions that transfer money to its chairman.”

　　例子：去年年底，在紐約上市的多元環(huán)球水務(wù)公司（Duoyuan Global Water Inc.）面臨多項(xiàng)指控，首當(dāng)其沖的便是存在會(huì)計(jì)處理不當(dāng)?shù)男袨?。今?月，監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)暫停這只股票的交易，因?yàn)樵摴局两裎茨芟騍EC提交備案文件。今年4月Muddy Waters的一份報(bào)告指出，多元水務(wù)公司涉及“未經(jīng)披露的不當(dāng)關(guān)聯(lián)方交易，這些交易將資金轉(zhuǎn)移至該公司主席名下”。

　　3. Overstating cash or understating bank loans.

　　3. 高估現(xiàn)金或低估銀行債務(wù)

　　Example: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA resigned as Longtop Financial Technologies Ltd.’s auditor in May, citing recently identified false financial records related to cash at bank and loan balances and possibly sales revenue. 例子：今年5月，德勤會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所（Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu）的注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師辭去了東南融通金融技術(shù)有限公司（Longtop Financial Technologies Ltd.）的審計(jì)師一職，因?yàn)榈虑诎l(fā)現(xiàn)與銀行存款及貸款余額相關(guān)的財(cái)務(wù)記錄存在造假行為，銷售收入可能也存在問(wèn)題。

　　The “three ways of detection”:

　　以下是三種發(fā)現(xiàn)問(wèn)題的方法：

　　1. Checking bank statements.

　　1. 查驗(yàn)銀行對(duì)賬單。

　　According to BofA-ML:

　　美銀美林說(shuō)：

　　“Many of these companies suffer from acute cash flow pressure, as they have to spend to convince outside parties, but their spending won’t generate economic returns, e.g., keeping a big sales team to make big sales numbers more plausible. As a result, they often have to live on borrowing from related parties or banks.”

　　這類公司中有很多都承受著巨大的現(xiàn)金流壓力，因?yàn)樗麄儾坏貌淮蟀鸦ㄥX以說(shuō)服外部各方。但這些支出不會(huì)產(chǎn)生經(jīng)濟(jì)效益：比如為了讓夸大的銷售數(shù)據(jù)看上去更為可信，他們不得不維持一只龐大的銷售隊(duì)伍。所以他們往往得向銀行或關(guān)聯(lián)方借款才能生存。

　　As such, BofA-ML recommends people check bank statements, which are “difficult to dress up.”

　　所以從這個(gè)角度說(shuō)，美銀美林建議各位查驗(yàn)銀行對(duì)賬單，因?yàn)殂y行對(duì)賬單很難造假。

　　2. Cross-checking with the company’s government filings.

　　2. 利用目標(biāo)公司向政府提交的備案文件交叉核驗(yàn)財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)。

　　BofA-ML says companies need to submit “more realistic” statements to relevant government authorities because “they are more difficult to fool.” As such, there’s often a gap between filings made to the government and to the public. 美銀美林說(shuō)，此類公司必須向有關(guān)政府機(jī)構(gòu)提交“更為真實(shí)”的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表，因?yàn)橛嘘P(guān)政府機(jī)構(gòu)更難以被糊弄。因此，向政府提交的備案文件和向公眾披露的數(shù)據(jù)之間往往存在差異。

　　3. Field checks.

　　3. 實(shí)地檢驗(yàn)。

　　BofA-ML recommends people actually go check out these companies’ operations where possible. In some cases, you don’t even go and get your hands dirty it cites the example of one publication which used online monitoring to discover that the traffic to New York-listed China Education Alliance’s website was much lower than reported.

　　美銀美林建議各位盡可能實(shí)地檢驗(yàn)此類公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)狀況。在某些情況下，你甚至都不用親自跑一趟。美銀美林舉了一個(gè)例子：一家刊物只是利用了在線監(jiān)測(cè)數(shù)據(jù)就發(fā)現(xiàn)了在紐約上市的中國(guó)教育聯(lián)盟（China Education Alliance）的網(wǎng)站流量數(shù)據(jù)比其公布的要低得多。