It is time to face facts: markets are not just betting against the euro but testing the European project itself. Tuesday’s Franco-German summit showed that the more leaders repeat outdated nostrums – such as the impossibility of eurobonds – the less they are believed. The Merkel-Sarkozy proposals were an attempt to paper over differences (with Germanic prudence on eurobonds and debt ceilings balancing Gallic pressure for economic governance) and buy time, but the past few months have shown that this piecemeal approach will simply increase the cost of a long-term solution. To save itself, the European Union must stop seeking loopholes and attacking symptoms, and instead grapple seriously with its fundamental design faults.

　　是時(shí)候直面事實(shí)了：市場(chǎng)不只是在看空歐元，也在考驗(yàn)歐洲一體化計(jì)劃本身。上周二的法德最高領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人會(huì)晤顯示，領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人物越是重復(fù)那些過(guò)時(shí)的“靈丹妙藥”——比如不可能發(fā)行歐元債券，他們的話就越?jīng)]人信。默克爾(Merkel)和薩科齊(Sarkozy)提出的建議旨在掩蓋分歧（德國(guó)對(duì)于歐元債券和債務(wù)上限的謹(jǐn)慎態(tài)度，平衡了法國(guó)在歐元區(qū)經(jīng)濟(jì)治理問(wèn)題上施加的壓力）和贏得時(shí)間，但過(guò)去幾個(gè)月的經(jīng)驗(yàn)表明，這種零敲碎打的方式只能增加長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)解決方案的成本。要想自救，歐盟(EU)必須停止查找漏洞和攻擊表面病癥，而是應(yīng)當(dāng)認(rèn)真應(yīng)對(duì)自身的根本設(shè)計(jì)缺陷。

　　Since the French and Dutch “no” votes in 2005, pro-Europeans have acted like the mythical boy with his finger in the dyke; unwilling to give ground for fear of a eurosceptic flood. As a result they have defended the unsatisfactory and unsustainable status quo: a currency not backed by a treasury; joint borders without a common migration policy; and a technocratic foreign policy divorced from national sources of power.

　　自從2005年法國(guó)和荷蘭投票否決了《歐盟憲法條約》以來(lái)，親歐派們的表現(xiàn)就像那個(gè)用手指堵住堤壩的神奇小男孩——因擔(dān)心歐洲懷疑論的“洪水”決堤而不肯讓步。因此，他們一直在捍衛(wèi)這令人不滿(mǎn)又無(wú)法維續(xù)的現(xiàn)狀：有共同貨幣，卻沒(méi)有財(cái)政部的支持；有共同邊界，卻沒(méi)有統(tǒng)一的移民政策；技術(shù)官僚制定的外交政策與國(guó)家權(quán)力的源頭背道而馳。

　　The only way to stop a tide of disintegration spreading beyond the euro to the EU itself is to tackle these problems head on. Doing so, however, means first giving up the dream of a one-speed Europe. EU nations have long travelled at different speeds, but now they need an institutional framework for a multi-speed future.

　　正面解決這些問(wèn)題是防止解體趨勢(shì)由歐元向歐盟蔓延的唯一方式。然而，這么做意味著首先必須放棄“單速歐洲”的夢(mèng)想。歐盟成員國(guó)長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)的發(fā)展速度不盡相同，但現(xiàn)在它們需要一個(gè)制度框架來(lái)規(guī)范“多速”的未來(lái)。

　　Rather than hiding this division, the EU now needs a model in which fast-lane nations act as pioneers who endow the whole project with new purpose. Yet even a multispeed Europe needs bigger fiscal transfers – the best option being an explicit deal between creditor and debtor nations. As well as reconciling austerity with debt support, this could develop a vision that balanced economic liberalisation with social protection.

　　歐盟不應(yīng)掩蓋分歧，而是需要采用一種模式，讓行駛在快車(chē)道的成員國(guó)充當(dāng)先鋒，為整個(gè)歐洲一體化項(xiàng)目賦予新的目標(biāo)。然而，即便是一個(gè)多速歐洲也需要更大規(guī)模的財(cái)政轉(zhuǎn)移——最佳選擇是債權(quán)國(guó)和債務(wù)國(guó)達(dá)成一項(xiàng)明確的協(xié)議。這么做不僅能夠兼顧緊縮措施與債務(wù)縮減，還可以形成一種在經(jīng)濟(jì)自由化和社會(huì)保護(hù)之間找到平衡的愿景。

　　Most importantly, Europe’s leaders must stop stripping the politics out of European integration. Instead of shrouding discussions in legalese, they must engage voters in a debate to reinvent the three big integration projects of the past 20 years: the euro, Schengen freedom of movement and a united foreign policy.

　　更重要的一點(diǎn)是，歐洲領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人必須停止把政治與歐洲一體化過(guò)程剝離。他們不應(yīng)進(jìn)行充滿(mǎn)法律術(shù)語(yǔ)的隱秘討論，而應(yīng)讓選民們加入討論，重造過(guò)去20年歐洲一體化的三大項(xiàng)目：歐元、申根簽證支持下的自由流動(dòng)以及統(tǒng)一的外交政策。

　　On the euro – the most existential of the crises – leaders have tried unsuccessfully to stem market panic but not dealt with deeper problems. Even after the latest summit, the policies fall short of the eurobonds, European banking regulation and pan-European deposit insurance schemes that are needed. New rules at the European financial stability facility – allowing it to support banks by buying Greek bonds, and even to recapitalise banks directly – marks a changed German position, whose logic backs new eurobonds. This must now be made explicit, and backed by a big EFSF expansion.

　　在這場(chǎng)危機(jī)中，歐元面臨最嚴(yán)重的存亡考驗(yàn)。歐洲領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人曾嘗試消除市場(chǎng)恐慌情緒，均告失敗，但從未試圖解決歐元更深層次的問(wèn)題。即便在最近的這場(chǎng)峰會(huì)之后，仍未出臺(tái)歐洲所需的歐元債券、歐洲銀行監(jiān)管和泛歐存款保險(xiǎn)制度的相關(guān)政策。歐洲金融穩(wěn)定安排(EFSF)的新規(guī)定允許其通過(guò)購(gòu)買(mǎi)希臘國(guó)債向銀行提供支持，甚至可以直接對(duì)銀行實(shí)施資本重組，這表明德國(guó)的立場(chǎng)發(fā)生了轉(zhuǎn)變，而新規(guī)的邏輯支持發(fā)行歐元債券。這一點(diǎn)目前必須向世人明示，并且輔以EFSF的大規(guī)模擴(kuò)充。

　　EU rules for border-free travel are also under pressure. When borders opened up, hundreds of thousands of refugees were entering Europe; now controls are being reintroduced because of only a few thousand Tunisian incomers. Rather than the current situation in which EU and national policy seem to conflict, a new common migration policy should include co-operation to secure the EU’s external borders, joint criteria for legal migration and a solidarity budget to help certain countries, such as Italy, to cope with sudden and large migratory movements.

　　歐盟有關(guān)內(nèi)部跨境自由流動(dòng)的規(guī)定也面臨著壓力。當(dāng)邊境開(kāi)放后，數(shù)十萬(wàn)難民涌進(jìn)了歐洲；而現(xiàn)在，僅僅因?yàn)閹浊炼湟泼竦牡絹?lái)，歐盟就重新采取了管控措施。目前的狀況是歐盟和成員國(guó)的政策有所抵觸，這是不可取的，應(yīng)當(dāng)重新制定共同的移民政策，內(nèi)容包括通過(guò)合作保障歐盟外部邊界的安全，確立共同的合法移民標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，設(shè)立一筆“團(tuán)結(jié)預(yù)算”幫助某些國(guó)家（比如意大利）應(yīng)對(duì)突如其來(lái)的大規(guī)模遷移運(yùn)動(dòng)。

　　Europe’s foreign policy must also regain credibility. The enlargement project has ground to a halt and the EU, once wooed by Turkey, is now branded comatose, stagnant and geriatric by its prime minister. Europe’s response to the Arab spring is governed by narrow national agricultural and immigration interests, not generosity, and imagination. The admirable action to save Benghazi may, in the long term, expose dwindling defence budgets.

　　歐洲的外交政策也必須重獲信任。歐盟擴(kuò)張計(jì)劃已經(jīng)停滯。土耳其先前曾極力向歐盟示好，如今連該國(guó)總理都給歐盟貼上了“萎靡不振、死氣沉沉、垂垂老矣”的標(biāo)簽。歐洲對(duì)“阿拉伯之春”的反應(yīng)受到了狹隘的國(guó)家農(nóng)業(yè)和移民利益的驅(qū)動(dòng)，未體現(xiàn)出寬宏大量，也毫無(wú)想象力可言。從長(zhǎng)期來(lái)看，歐洲拯救班加西的可敬行動(dòng)或許會(huì)曝光歐洲防務(wù)預(yù)算的日益減少。

　　Rather than relying on national foreign policies coupled with an EU bureaucracy tasked with delivering “enlargement-lite”, EU governments must learn to exercise power collectively towards countries that will never be EU members. A task force to develop a more compelling EU response to the Arab spring, and a commission to strengthen the pooling of defence capabilities would be a good start.

　　歐盟不應(yīng)依賴(lài)成員國(guó)的外交政策和以“輕擴(kuò)張”(enlargement-lite)為己任的歐洲官僚機(jī)構(gòu)，歐盟各國(guó)政府必須學(xué)會(huì)向絕不可能加入歐盟的國(guó)家共同行使權(quán)力。設(shè)立一個(gè)特別行動(dòng)組，推動(dòng)歐盟對(duì)“阿拉伯之春”做出更具說(shuō)服力的反應(yīng)，并建立一個(gè)委員會(huì)，以加強(qiáng)防務(wù)能力的集中，這將是一個(gè)良好的開(kāi)端。

　　EU integration has always moved forward through repetitive crises, but only political leadership can turn these into sources of new energy. Thankfully, all of Europe’s problems come from a lack of will, not a lack of military or economic capacity. Even its military spending is second only to that of the US, and around double that of Brazil, India, China and Russia combined.

　　歐盟一體化在前行途中不斷遭遇危機(jī)，但只有政治領(lǐng)袖們能將危機(jī)變成新的能量源泉。值得慶幸的是，歐洲所有的問(wèn)題都源于缺乏意志力，而不是軍事或經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力不濟(jì)。歐洲的軍費(fèi)開(kāi)支甚至僅次于美國(guó)，大約是巴西、印度、中國(guó)和俄羅斯總和的兩倍。

　　The eurozone’s debt and deficits are also far lower than in the US, Japan or even the UK. Yet the EU’s failure to govern itself is fuelling global perceptions of decline, in turn making Europe’s citizens even more short-sighted, as they try to protect their slice of a shrinking cake. EU leaders’ attempts to defend the status quo only reinforce a vicious circle of enfeeblement. Conservatism will not break this cycle of decline. To save Europe, we must reinvent it.

　　歐元區(qū)的債務(wù)和赤字水平也遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)低于美國(guó)和日本，甚至都沒(méi)有英國(guó)高。不過(guò)，歐盟未能管好自己加劇了全球?qū)τ跉W洲衰落的印象，這反過(guò)來(lái)又讓歐洲人更加短視，他們正在竭力保護(hù)自己那塊不斷縮小的蛋糕。歐盟領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人維持現(xiàn)狀的努力，只不過(guò)強(qiáng)化了歐洲不斷虛弱的惡性循環(huán)。保守主義將無(wú)法打破這種衰落的循環(huán)。要拯救歐洲，我們必須重造歐洲。