Watching China bully Wal-Mart Stores this week -- and watching Wal-Mart prostrate itself under the beating -- is an embarrassing reminder of a simple fact:

　　本周，看著中國欺負(fù)沃爾瑪(Wal-Mart Stores)，又看著沃爾瑪在棍棒下卑躬屈膝，不由得尷尬地想起這樣一個(gè)簡單的事實(shí)：

　　China, the world's fastest-growing major market, has the upper hand with U.S. business. Its array of protectionist barriers, weak rule of law and siren-like market make events like this all but inevitable.

　　作為世界上增長最快的主要市場，中國在美國商界面前占據(jù)上風(fēng)。中國的一系列保護(hù)主義壁壘、薄弱的法治和誘人的市場，使得出現(xiàn)這樣的事情幾乎是不可避免的。

　　This state of play may also be one reason Congress is fulminating again over China's currency. The Senate this week passed a bill that could penalize China for keeping its currency artificially weak, which makes the country's products cheap in global markets.

　　這一現(xiàn)狀可能也是美國國會(huì)對(duì)中國匯率再度發(fā)難的一個(gè)原因。參議院本周通過一項(xiàng)議案，可能會(huì)因?yàn)橹袊藶閴旱腿嗣駧艆R率、使中國產(chǎn)品在國際市場上售價(jià)低廉而對(duì)它施以懲罰。

　　Currency offers a simple focus that plays well with constituents. So currency has become a dangerous proxy for much else that is wrong with doing business in China.

　　匯率問題形成了一個(gè)簡單的關(guān)注焦點(diǎn)，適合爭取選民。于是，在中國經(jīng)商遇到的很多其他問題都經(jīng)由匯率問題來討論，這是很危險(xiǎn)的。

　　First, Wal-Mart: 先來看看沃爾瑪：

　　In the company's stores in the city of Chongqing, nonorganic pork was labeled 'organic.' This was the mistake. The pork was otherwise fine.

　　在重慶的沃爾瑪門店，不是有機(jī)的豬肉被標(biāo)為“有機(jī)”。錯(cuò)誤就在這里，除此以外這些豬肉沒有問題。

　　Seizing on this error at a time when inflation is a hot-button issue in China, officials accused Wal-Mart of cheating the public by charging premium prices for regular meat. They fined the company, shut down all 13 Wal-Marts in the city and jailed a number of Wal-Mart employees. The actions played well in the national media.

　　在通貨膨脹成為中國熱點(diǎn)問題之際，官方抓住這個(gè)錯(cuò)誤，指責(zé)沃爾瑪高價(jià)賣普通肉、欺騙公眾。他們對(duì)沃爾瑪采取罰款措施，關(guān)閉了重慶的全部13家沃爾瑪超市，還拘留了幾名沃爾瑪員工。這些措施在中國媒體中受到好評(píng)。

　　There is little if any recourse in authoritarian China when something like this happens to a U.S. company. There aren't regular courts. Like many other U.S. firms that have run afoul of nationalist sentiments in China, Wal-Mart could only beg forgiveness. It has nearly 350 stores in China with revenue of $7.5 billion.

　　相關(guān)報(bào)道在威權(quán)主義的中國，當(dāng)這樣的事情發(fā)生在一家美國公司身上時(shí)，可依靠的渠道即使有，也非常少。那里沒有正規(guī)的法院。跟很多沖撞了中國民族主義情緒的其他美國公司一樣，沃爾瑪也只能乞求原諒。它在中國的門店接近350家，收入75億美元。

　　So Wal-Mart dropped to its knees.

　　所以沃爾瑪屈膝而跪。

　　The company apologized, issued a statement declaring “the rights of consumers were infringed,” and said it accepted the 15-day forced closure of its stores as an opportunity “to focus on implementing corrective actions.”

　　它道歉了，發(fā)布聲明宣稱“侵犯了消費(fèi)者的權(quán)益”，并說它接受強(qiáng)制關(guān)閉門店15天的措施，以借此機(jī)會(huì)“集中精力全面落實(shí)整改措施”。

　　In a phone interview, a Wal-Mart regional executive in Hong Kong was similarly obsequious -- and circumspect, lest he ruffle feathers in Chongqing. Pressed, he said there were past issues with the stores, but declined to elaborate. Chinese officials said the issues entailed numerous violations, including fraudulent advertising and selling expired food.

　　沃爾瑪駐香港一位地區(qū)高管接受電話采訪時(shí)也是同樣卑躬屈膝，小心翼翼，以防惹怒重慶方面。追問之下，他說這些門店過去也有問題，但拒絕詳述。中國官員說，這些問題涉及多起違規(guī)，包括虛假宣傳、出售過期食品。

　　An American executive in Beijing who watches these matters says the Wal-Mart saga is less about substance and more about the bigger problems U.S. business has with China. “You walk into any Chinese supermarket and can find things sold past their expiration date,” he says. “Wal-Mart has done more to secure the safety of the food supply.” Borrowing an old Chinese saying, he adds, “It's just an extraordinary example of killing the chicken to scare the monkeys,” with the food industry the chicken, and the rest of foreign business the monkeys. The message to companies: Know your place and pay obeisance.

　　一位關(guān)注勢態(tài)發(fā)展的駐北京美國公司高管說，沃爾瑪風(fēng)波并不在于具體事情，而是更多地反映出美國公司與中國之間的更大問題。他說，你走進(jìn)任何一家中國超市，都能發(fā)現(xiàn)有過期商品在銷售；沃爾瑪在保證食品供應(yīng)安全方面比其他公司做的更多。他還說，借用中國的一句老話，這是“殺雞給猴看”的絕好例子，食品行業(yè)是雞，其他外國公司是猴。中國當(dāng)局向公司發(fā)出的信息是：知道自己的身份，乖乖聽話。

　　That strong arm is evident in other venues. For two years U.S. companies have been fighting new government procurement rules that give preference to Chinese products. Beijing finally abandoned the rules this year, but apparently not the preference.

　　這種強(qiáng)勢的控制在其他領(lǐng)域也很明顯。兩年來，美國公司一直在對(duì)抗偏向中國產(chǎn)品的政府采購新規(guī)定。北京今年最終取消了規(guī)定，但顯然沒有消除偏心。

　　“What's really concerning companies is that there's not a discernible change in the provinces and local governments on this whole question,” says John Neuffer of the Information Technology Industry Council, a trade group. An executive with a U.S. technology company adds: “China uses a whole host of rules to steer procurement to favored companies.” If it isn't outright discrimination against foreign firms, he says, it is technical standards that “make it difficult for a foreign company to make a bid.”

　　美國行業(yè)組織信息技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)理事會(huì)(Information Technology Industry Council)的諾弗爾(John Neuffer)說，令公司真正感到擔(dān)心的是，省級(jí)政府和地方政府在整個(gè)問題上并沒有明顯的改變。美國一家科技公司的一位高管還說，中國利用一整套規(guī)定在采購方面向青睞的公司傾斜。他說，如果不是對(duì)外國公司的直接歧視，就是制定技術(shù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)令外國公司難以競標(biāo)。

　　The rules are part of a broader industrial policy to promote “indigenous innovation” in China, or innovation that China owns. It is with this goal in mind that China virtually requires many foreign industrial and technology companies entering the market to form a joint venture with a state-owned firm and to transfer technology to China. Hungry for sales, U.S. companies have piled in, handing over top-of-the-line technology in aviation, autos, electronics, energy and more.

　　這些規(guī)定是推動(dòng)中國“自主創(chuàng)新”的更廣泛行業(yè)政策的一部分。正是出于這一目的，中國實(shí)際上要求很多希望進(jìn)入中國市場的外國工業(yè)和科技公司與中國國有公司成立合資企業(yè)或向中國轉(zhuǎn)讓技術(shù)。渴望銷售產(chǎn)品的美國公司蜂擁而至，把航空、汽車、電子、能源及更多領(lǐng)域的尖端技術(shù)拱手相讓。

　　“This technology toll booth is troublesome; a large number of the companies I talk to have this concern,” says Bob Hormats, the State Department's top economic official. U.S. firms, he says, “have to pay the high price of giving up very good technology” that Chinese companies then use to compete in global markets. “It weakens our economic base, our ability to create jobs and the profitability of our companies.”

　　美國國務(wù)院首席經(jīng)濟(jì)官員霍馬茨(Bob Hormats)說，這種技術(shù)“收費(fèi)站”很成問題，我與之談過話的很多公司都有這樣的擔(dān)心。他說，美國公司必須付出高昂的代價(jià)，交出好的技術(shù)，中國公司隨后利用這些技術(shù)在全球市場展開競爭；這會(huì)削弱美國的經(jīng)濟(jì)基礎(chǔ)，削弱美國創(chuàng)造就業(yè)崗位的能力和美國公司的盈利能力。

　　The list of sticky problems goes on -- new taxes in China on foreign employers, more subsidies for domestic industries, continued theft of intellectual property. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which represents U.S. companies, this month issued its annual list of concerns about business practices in China. It runs more than 100 pages, single-spaced.

　　外國公司面臨的難題數(shù)不勝數(shù)，比如中國對(duì)外國雇主征收的新稅，對(duì)國內(nèi)行業(yè)的更多補(bǔ)貼，竊取知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的現(xiàn)象屢見不鮮。代表美國公司的美國商會(huì)(U.S. Chamber of Commerce)本月公布了一份年度報(bào)告，羅列出了對(duì)在華開展業(yè)務(wù)的種種擔(dān)憂。這份報(bào)告長達(dá)100多頁，而且還是單行行距。

　　Notably, the same U.S. companies in China that previously went to Washington to lobby for normalized trade ties with Beijing now often go to gripe. China has thus lost many of its chief advocates.

　　尤其值得一提的是，那些在華開展業(yè)務(wù)、此前到華盛頓游說對(duì)華貿(mào)易關(guān)系正常化的美國公司，如今卻常常滿腹牢騷。中國因此失去了很多主要的支持者。

　　Perhaps for this reason, and because of broader frustrations, the Senate mustered the votes to pass its currency-manipulation bill this week. The bill, if passed by the House, risks igniting a trade war with China. It is at minimum a provocation.

　　或許因?yàn)檫@個(gè)原因，以及更加廣泛的不滿情緒，美國參議院本周進(jìn)行投票通過了涉及人民幣匯率操縱的法案。這項(xiàng)法案如果在眾議院獲得通過，將可能引發(fā)中美貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)。這至少來說是一種挑釁。

　　But for those who have tired of watching the beatings in China's many Chongqings, maybe that just no longer matters.

　　不過，對(duì)于那些厭倦了觀看在中國很多城市像重慶這樣“欺負(fù)”外國公司的人，或許這已經(jīng)不重要了。