Chinese stocks are pushing record lows. The Hang Seng China Enterprises index could be bought for 1.33 times book value on Friday. The last time the finest red-chips were trading that cheaply, almost exactly three years ago, policymakers swung into action with interest rate cuts, a bank-loan binge and Rmb4,000bn of fiscal stimulus. This time, the prospect of a similar package looks remote indeed.

　　中國(guó)股市正逼近歷史低點(diǎn)。上周五，恒生中國(guó)企業(yè)指數(shù)(Hang Seng China Enterprises Index)的市凈率為1.33倍。上一次這些最優(yōu)質(zhì)的紅籌股價(jià)格如此便宜，是差不多正好三年前，當(dāng)時(shí)政策制定者迅速采取了一系列措施，包括降息、開(kāi)啟銀行貸款閘門(mén)和推出4萬(wàn)億元人民幣的財(cái)政刺激計(jì)劃。而這一次，出臺(tái)類(lèi)似方案的可能性十分渺茫。

　　While a cut in the reserve requirement ratio, now at an all-time high of 21.5 per cent, could ease the flow of credit to small and medium-sized enterprises, which account for four-fifths of China’s job creation, the People’s Bank will be disinclined to risk it. In August, consumer price inflation fell a little, to 6.2 per cent. But it remains too high to signal a change in policy direction, while in October 2008 CPI was rapidly tumbling toward zero.

　　目前，中國(guó)的存款準(zhǔn)備金率處于21.5%的歷史高位，雖然降低這一比率可以促使信貸流向?yàn)橹袊?guó)創(chuàng)造五分之四就業(yè)的中小企業(yè)，但中國(guó)央行(People's Bank of China)將不愿意冒險(xiǎn)采取這種做法。8月，消費(fèi)價(jià)格指數(shù)(CPI)略微回落至6.2%，但仍然過(guò)高，表明政策方向還不能變。而在2008年10月時(shí)，CPI正向零快速滑落。

　　Further, bank lending officers will not be allowed off the leash so soon after the excesses of 2009/2010, when M2 money supply growth averaged almost double the current rate of 13.5 per cent, a seven-year low. Fears of rising non-performing loanshave already savaged bank valuations.

　　此外，在2009-2010年的過(guò)度放貸之后，銀行的信貸人員短期內(nèi)將不會(huì)被允許放松貸款。在2009-2010年間，M2貨幣供給量的平均增長(zhǎng)率幾乎是現(xiàn)在的兩倍。現(xiàn)在13.5%的增長(zhǎng)率是七年來(lái)的最低水平。對(duì)不良貸款增加的擔(dān)憂(yōu)，已經(jīng)影響了銀行股的估值。

　　Fiscally, China seems in fair shape. The central budget is in surplus, and total government debt – including local government debt, and the stock of historical NPLs now housed in asset management agencies – is about half of gross domestic product. But since 2008 many of China’s provinces have been running fiscal deficits as large as or larger than Greece or Portugal, as they funded projects of questionable benefits. While the full extent of claims on its revenues through internal transfers remains uncertain, the ministry of finance will not enthusiastically embrace a fresh round of stimulus.

　　中國(guó)的財(cái)政狀況看上去相當(dāng)不錯(cuò)。中央預(yù)算仍為盈余，總體政府債務(wù)，包括地方政府債務(wù)和由資產(chǎn)管理公司持有的存量歷史不良貸款，大約為GDP的50%。但自2008年以來(lái)，中國(guó)許多省份的政府由于為收益可疑的項(xiàng)目提供資金，財(cái)政赤字已經(jīng)等同、或超過(guò)希臘或葡萄牙的水平。在最終將通過(guò)內(nèi)部轉(zhuǎn)移支付多少開(kāi)支還不確定的情況下，財(cái)政部將不會(huì)積極支持新一輪刺激計(jì)劃。

　　Investors should not prepare for a world without a Chinese growth engine. But they should accept that Beijing cannot crank it much harder.

　　投資者尚不必去面對(duì)一個(gè)沒(méi)有中國(guó)作為增長(zhǎng)引擎的世界。但他們應(yīng)該接受一個(gè)事實(shí)：中國(guó)政府不可能再下大力氣為它增添火力。